Wang Liqiang: Fraud, Defector, or Both?

This month, the People’s Republic of China and its intelligence services again made headlines in the world press for authoritarian and repressive practices. However, this time the activities we’re not targeted at the Uighur minorities in Xinjiang province nor political dissidents, nor Fanlun gong practitioners, but at democratic movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan.  Self-proclaimed defector WANG “William” Liqiang emerged in the Australian media working for China’s military intelligence apparatus in Hong Kong.

Former CIA counterspy master James Angleton characterized counterintelligence as a ‘Wilderness of Mirrors’.  So when a defector requests asylum in a country, officials and the media wonder whether or not he (or she) is lying. Intelligence Officers, on the other hand, wonder exactly how much the person is lying.

The psychology and motivations of a defector are complex. While defectors to the West often claim to have had a change of heart, and a belief in freedom and democracy, the true motivation to leave one’s family, employment, and country can be quite different.  Often, motivations range from being caught in corruption or criminal acts to professional rivalries to illicit love affairs.  Infighting between rival political factions in Chinese Communist Party politics has been a strong incentive for officials (former and current) to defect to safety.  Another common characteristic common for defectors is to exaggerate his or her importance in the system or knowledge of events.  Lastly, defectors can sometimes (intentionally or otherwise) alter their description of events by shielding people they like and exaggerating the actions of former enemies or rivals.  Given these behavioral characteristics it is likely that the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization is quite busy working with allies to confirm or refute the details of Mr. Wang’s stories.

There is considerable public discussion on whether the Wang defection is genuine and his reported his history accurately.  There has been some speculation that his defection is a scam designed just to be granted asylum in Australia.  A story of this depth does not seem to be necessary for asylum in Australia.  Wang would probably only have needed to attend a few Hong Kong pro-democracy demonstrations and then provided pictures along with a story about how the police were looking for him.  That simple story would probably have been enough to grant him asylum.  Instead, he provided in-depth information identifying media outlets, financial transactions, business firms, and individuals he claims are involved in espionage and covert action against Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Australia.

There are several interesting aspects of the Wang case that have yet to be resolved:

  1. Wang has spoken publicly about his experiences.  Public release of information generally does not occur unless there is a reason. Perhaps the Australian government has doubts about him and is likely to deny his asylum claim. Making his story public, true or not, would all but assure Australia would not return him to China or Hong Kong.
  2. China has claimed (and produced video footage) that Wang is a criminal and was convicted of fraud in Guangze County, Fujian Province in 2016. Wang details being in Hong Kong since at least early 2015.  In addition, when Wang applied for an Australian visa in 2018, China responded to the Australian government in that he had no criminal record.
  3. The video footage produced by China’s Public Security Bureau could not be located in a Wayback Machine search of Wang’s case on the Internet archive of the China Judgments Online website. Google and Baidu search engines also did not find his case in archive files. (Note – this is not necessarily conclusive evidence it does not exist. Just that it could not be located via the normal archival search engine in the Chinese court system).

The timeline of events considers claims provided by Wang, the PRC, and recent media articles. Several of these claims conflict, putting Wang in different locations at the same time.

Timeline of events:

  • 2011 – 2013 Wang attends higher education in fine arts.
  • 2014 – Wang works in Shanghai.
  • 2014 – Wang arrives in Hong Kong
  • 2015 – China’s Ministry of Public Security conducts rendition operation against Hong Kong based Causeway Bay bookstore owners.
  • 2015 – December, China says Wang was involved in a dispute over a property purchase in 2013 in the southeast province of Anhui. The court dismissed the lawsuit in which Wang was accused of failing to repay loans.
  • 2016 – China Innovation Investment Company Ltd. indicted for corruption in Shanghai court.
  • 2016 – Wang appears before court in Guangze County, Fujian Province for fraud
  • 2016 – Media companies owned by Guotai Holdings, China Trends, and China Innovation (Where Wang worked) companies have assets frozen by Shanghai Economic Investigation Division for fraud. Attorneys resolve legal issues.
  • 2017 – April, China Innovation Investment Company Ltd. denied business purchase in Taiwan due to national security concerns.
  • 2018 – February, Wang applies for Australian entry visa to visit family.
  • 2019 – Wang defects to Australia

If even just some of Wang’s stories about operations are true then he is a low level defector.  He was not an actual intelligence officer, nor did he receive any training in clandestine intelligence tradecraft.  He knows nothing of the intelligence services organizational structure and processes beyond his immediate work environment.  By his own description of duties he appears to have been some type of office assistant.  In that role, he is one of the hundreds of thousands of people worldwide that Beijing’s intelligence apparatus recruits into service.  The US Intelligence Community identifies these people as support agents (or co-optees) depending on the nationality and specific job functions.

But unlike so many other co-optees, Wang was employed in Hong Kong by a company managed by the People’s Liberation Army, General Staff Department.  In that position, he participated in activities designed to derail democratic movements and punish those individuals and organizations the Chinese Communist Party viewed as a threat.  And while Wang did not have access to high level planning or decision making in the intelligence services, his operational experiences provide unique insights into the capabilities, weaknesses, and operational methodologies of China’s military intelligence service.


Several high level findings can be derived from analyzing Wang’s 17 page official statement to the Australian government and China’s intelligence operational practices:

  1. China’s PLA General Staff Department (likely the Military Intelligence Department) conducts direct action and covert influence operations to alter governments and political events in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
  2. China’s Military Intelligence Department is integrated with civil society and private commercial companies to conduct covert action, technology transfer, and clandestine collection.
  3. Commercial companies working with the PLA General Staff Department are profit making ventures, in large part due to their relationship with the Chinese government.
  4. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Australia are key targets for China’s intelligence influence operations.
  5. The Republic of Korea alias passport presented by Wang demonstrates technical proficiency in counterfeiting but poor quality control leaving the bearer vulnerable to arrest.


Wang detailed his operational activities beginning with his personal background and government supplied cover documents:

Wang described himself as university educated in the fine arts. He won a two national art awards and six awards in municipal art exhibitions but was unable to make a good living at it. Both his parents we’re government bureaucrats in good positions as was his father-in-law. This simple fact afforded him access to employment opportunities. With his family’s political standing he was recommended for a position in a company in Shanghai managed by the General Staff Department.  Such appointments of family members are common in Chinese society.

Wang stated he worked hard and was promoted in that company. He accepted a position in Hong Kong for a better quality of life and thought he would be involved in what the company described as “Wealth Storm” which Wang believed to be cultural activities.  While he does not specifically name the company in Shanghai, the companies he worked for in Hong Kong are identified as the China Innovation Investment Company Ltd. and China Trends Holding Limited.

Alias Identity documents

According to Mr. Wang, the Information Centre of National Defence University in Hunan Province issued him alias documents on May 14th, 2019.  The documents were issued under two alias names.  Wang provides no information on source of his digital passport photos for these documents.

  1. South Korean Passport:

Wang was issued a South Korean passport under the alias name WANG Gang.  The South Korean passport has a number of security features which make it difficult to reproduce even for the best of criminal organizations.  See Figure 1. Those features include laminate page cover fluorescent printing, photos, microprinting, a ghost photo, and the Machine Readable Zone with biometric data.  The Machine Readable Zone is two 44 character lines with the following information: name, passport number, nationality, date of birth, sex, and passport expiration date.

Analyzed Wang Passport

There are three entries in this passport that raise questions on the quality of the forgery and its intended operational use:

  1. Why use the name Wang Gang?  Wang is a very common Chinese name but very rare for Koreans. The year 2000 South Korean Census listed only 23,447 individuals with the name of Wang (Hangul: ).  Picking such an unusual name for a South Korean only draws unwanted attention to the passport bearer. The only logical reason for using this name is that the individual looks Chinese and that an appropriate cover name is necessary.  An in-depth cover story and support documentation should have been developed but was not.
  2. Wang does not speak Korean, therefore the issuance of this passport for anything other than ‘flash’ purposes is a poor operational choice. Crossing an international border with a passport in a language one does not speak is extremely risky.
  3. The Korean name on the passport in the lower right area is completely different from the English name listed.  Obviously, this is a glaring error and it indicates the counterfeiter producing the passport did not read Korean and was unaware that the name of the original bearer was printed on the exemplar document.  It should be noted that it is quite likely that some number of Korean passports have been forged and issued to Chinese intelligence operatives (or criminals) and that they could contain the same mistake of including the incorrect name in Korean (Hangul).

The issuance of this document shows poor operational tradecraft despite the technical proficiency in reproducing security features.  Once in-country, how is the individual expected to operate (rent rooms, office space, establish bank accounts, wire money, etc. holding a false (and flawed passport) in a language that the bearer does not speak?  How was the operative expected to buy anything unless they had a credit card with the same name?  And yet this was the supposed plan for Wang’s travel and residence in Taiwan.

Criminal organizations normally steal passports and then match the physical characteristics to buyers to cut down on required alterations.  That often leaves only the photo to substitute and the person then travels under the assumed name.  Alternatively, with sophisticated graphics programs and expensive printing capabilities, the entire bio page with security features can be copied and reproduced with new data.

The forgery of this passport was most likely done by a sophisticated Chinese government or criminal entity despite the poor choice of country, poor operational use plan, and amateurish mistake in naming convention.[i]  If it was done in support of Chines e intelligence operations then it represents poor tradecraft (Unless used only for “flash purposes”).   I base this conclusion on the ability of the forger to reproduce the document’s extensive security features (many of which are visible in the single page provided).

  1. Chinese Passport and Hong Kong Identity Card:

The Information Centre of National Defence University in Hunan Province also issued Wang a PRC passport and Hong Kong Identity Card in the alias name of WANG Qiang.  The Chinese passport already contained a French visa and entry/exit stamps dated 26 May (12 days AFTER he received these documents).  According to Wang he was issued these documents while in Hong Kong. Although the year is not stated he makes reference to the upcoming trip to Taiwan which was to take place on May 16th, 2019.

Wang Chinese Alias Passport
Wang Chinese Alias Passport


Conclusion on Alias Identity Documents:

The PRC alias passport used the same digital photo of Wang as was used in the Korean passport. This fact plus the as yet undisputed statement that both documents contained French entry/exit stamps indicates they were produced by the same issuing organization. They were likely produced and issued at the same time as Wang states but could have been done different times if the issuing organization maintained his digital photo on file.

The fact the PRC can produce its own passports and Hong Kong identity cards is expected. That these documents are used as cover for operational activities is also common practice for intelligence agencies.  The French visa and entry/exit stamps are also indicative of a professional counterfeiting operation.

Arrival in Hong Kong

Upon arriving in Hong Kong, Wang states he was met by XIANG Xin who is Chief Executive Officer of China Innovation Investment Ltd. and, according to Wang, leads collection operations and covert action campaigns.  Wang states that after working together Xiang confided in him that his true name was Xiang Nianxin, but he was required to change it when he moved to Hong Kong to begin his intelligence work.  This practice is characteristic of many Chinese intelligence operations. (* Note: This name change was recently confirmed in the media by Taiwan authorities.)

Xiang is a graduate of the Nanjing University of Science and Technology, identified in China as one of the “Seven Sons of National Defense”.  Nanjing University does weapons and related research to support the People’s Liberation Army.  It has been identified numerous times for attempting to acquire foreign military technology.  It is administered by the China’s State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND – formerly the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for national defense).  SASTIND has an intelligence section responsible for tasking military technology related collection requirements to the PLA – Military Intelligence Department, Ministry of State Security, Universities, and State Owned Entities.

China Innovation Investment Limited is a Hong Kong-based investment holding company incorporated in the Cayman Islands in 2002.  It is principally engaged in the investment in dual usage of military and civil sectors. The Company’s investments include military and civil energy related technologies including dual-used charge storage batteries, new models of lighting products, eco-equipment materials and energy-saving media terminals. Its principal investment objective is to achieve short and medium-term capital appreciation by investing in listed and unlisted companies mainly in Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[ii] [iii]

China Trends Holdings Limited is a Hong Kong-based investment holding company principally engaged in the trading of electronic technologies and related products. The Company operates through two business segments: the trading of electronic technology and related products (low carbon) and a media operating segment.[iv]

According to corporate records, both companies are located at the same address and share three individuals in executive leadership positions.

26/F, No. 9 Des Voeux Road West, Sheung Wan
Xin XIANG, Executive Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer
Cheong Yee Chan, Executive Director
Wancheng Li, Company Secretary

Wang describes Xin Xiang as his boss in Hong Kong and one of the General Staff Department’s key figures in suppressing pro-democracy activities there.  Xiang’s wife Gong Qing is also a board member and identified as an intelligence officer.  On November 24th, 2019 Xiang and his wife were arrested in Taiwan on national security charges while attempting to depart the country from Taipei’s Taoyuan International Airport.

In December 2016, Xiang and Gong, on behalf of China Innovation Investment Ltd., attempted to establish a real estate and investment company in Taiwan. The Ministry of Economic Affairs rejected the application because of the company’s relationship with China’s military.  China Innovation Investment then filed an administrative appeal but in April 2017; the appeal was rejected on national security grounds.  This action means that in 2016 Taiwan had information about China Innovation Investment Ltd. that raised concerns about the pending purchase.  Media reports in 2019 state that those national security concerns are the civil-military technology transfer activities of the company.  However, it is also possible that Wang was providing information to Taiwan authorities by late 2016.

Wang described his role at the China Innovation Investment Ltd. in the supporting the GSD in Hong Kong as follows:

  1. Infiltrate Hong Kong Universities to gauge and alter student opinions.
  2. Suppress democracy advocates in Hong Kong
  3. Collect military information, purchase and steal weapons technology
  4. Infiltrate Taiwan and manipulate elections.
  5. Support rendition activities against dissidents in Hong Kong at the direction of the CCP leadership. (Note * According to Wang this was only done in the case of the Causeway Bay book sellers. It was a very publicly reported event)
  6. Embezzle public funds through corporate espionage

Mr. Wang detailed his work in Hong Kong and Taiwan in each of the above mentioned categories.  He identifies (in some detail) the following organizations, select personnel, and their activities.

Wang Chart

Infiltrate Hong Kong Universities to gauge and alter student opinions.

Wang claims to have collaborated with Ms. Gong Qing (wife of Xin Xiang) to infiltrate universities to suppress democracy advocates. To accomplish this task they hosted dinner parties and small meetings with mainland students studying at Hong Kong universities recruiting them to spy on students. Recruitment efforts focused on Chinese students from Nanjing University of Science and Technology and Shantou University.  Wang identified corporate officer CHEN Banyan as the person responsible for collecting information.  Donations and research scholarships were provided to universities in Hong Kong to those who supported the mainland’s positions.  These activities were managed by Ms. Gong and executed through China Trust Education Fund Association.  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provides an annual subsidy of RMB 500 million to the Association.  Interestingly, Wang describes his own role in this activity as largely administrative “relaying tasks dispatched from Xin Xiang and explaining purposes of pertinent policies to mainland Chinese students…”.

Wang describes the effectiveness of this collection activity to the point of stating free speech does not exist in Hong Kong universities.  Given the anti PRC protests and violent responses emanating from Hong Kong universities (in late 2019) one can conclude China’s intelligence apparatus has been largely ineffective in stopping student activities.  Wang’s assertions – if true — pose questions as to the operational relationship between the military intelligence apparatus and China’s Ministry of Public Security.

Suppression of Democracy Advocates and Dissidents in Hong Kong

Wang states the suppression of democracy in Taiwan and Hong Kong as being accomplished through Beijing controlled or influenced media. He asserts this is the responsibility of liaison officers and lists10 media outlets.  He also identified tens of millions of RMB provided to these media outlets by the CCP.  Many media outlets are publicly well known for their support to the PRC as is their financial support from the CCP.

Causeway Bay Books rendition.  In late 2015 China’s Public Security Bureau kidnapped five staff members over a two month period from the Hong Kong based Causeway Bay Book store.  They were residents of Hong Kong.  Two persons appeared months later on Chinese TV confessing to selling dissident materials.  China had long been upset about the sales of books from this store critical of the PRC and Xi Jinping.

Infiltrate Taiwan and manipulate elections

Wang asserts company leaders Xiang and Gong made many trips to Taiwan and financed media outlets to support KMT political candidates.  The plan was to infiltrate media outlets, restaurants, and temples.  “RMB 1500 million has been given in the form of donations and investment to media groups in Taiwan”.  He also identified specific groups and individuals in Taiwan that have received payments and alleges 200,000 social media accounts were opened in Hong Kong to spread fake news to sway Taiwan’s elections.

Collect military information, purchase and steal weapons technology

Wang identifies the Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NUST) Alumni Association (Chairman Jing Xu) as working with Xin Xiang to acquire and transfer foreign military related technology from countries worldwide through Hong Kong to the PRC.  He identified a process of dismantling equipment and shipping separately to avoid detection.


There are several problems with Wang’s story on his activities in Hong Kong and related to Taiwan.  The information is actually easy for the Australian government to verify as it relates to travel, residency, and employment.  Each of these functions leave a trail of documentary evidence and are verifiable aspects of someone’s life in a city like Hong Kong.

  • The video provided by the PRC purportedly showing Wang in 2016 being convicted has some potential errors and conflicts with Wang’s story.
    • Wang was either in China or Hong Kong at this time. It cannot be both.
    • The video is allegedly of Wang confessing to a crime and being convicted. The video is too far away from the subject to determine identity and to employ facial recognition technology.
  • China reported that Wang was convicted of a major crime then released prior to sentencing. It is alleged he escaped China prior to being sentenced. This process is not consistent with China’s legal system’s standard practices. Upon conviction, a sentence is imposed based on the “relevant provisions of the law and in light of the facts and nature of the crime, the circumstances under which the crime is committed and the degree of harmness [sic] done to the society”.[v]  According to scholars on China’s legal system it is extremely unlikely an individual charged with a criminal act would be released prior to sentencing.
  • The question of when Wang entered Hong Kong and how long he was there is central to the validity of his story. This simple point can be verified through documents.
    • It should be easy to make that determination through travel documents, entry/exit stamps, housing records, bank statements, tax records, cell phone call history, purchase receipts, etc.
  • The question of Wang’s motivations. The question of Wang’s motivations to defect appear to be a core issue in the validity of his story.  In fact, they are only one data element in making that determination.  Whether he truly loves freedom is really irrelevant to determining exactly what was done and when.  To date, plausible motivations to defect are as follows:
    • Love of freedom and democracy as he states?
    • Regret for suppression of democratic values and institutions in Hong Kong and Taiwan?
    • Fear of China’s intelligence services?
    • Fear of imprisonment in China due to criminal acts as the PRC states?
  • Espionage and influence operations.
    • In his testimony, Wang provides many details about individuals, relationships, financial transactions, and communications employed in low level espionage and influence operations in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
      • Wang identifies dozens of organizations and individuals involved in influence activities in Taiwan.
        • Wang’s reporting includes names of persons, organizations, and payment amounts.
        • Xiang and Gong have been detained in Taiwan, presumably based on Wang’s public disclosures.
    • Despite media reports to the contrary, most of this information provided by Wang is not publicly available.
  • Wang also reports incorrect information that is publicly available.
    • Wang repeatedly uses the name the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (国防科学技术工业委员会).  However, this organization was merged into the newly created Ministry of Information and Industry in 2008 and renamed the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (国家国防科技工业局).
      1. This error likely indicates the following:
        • He has no contact (direct or otherwise) with the organization.
        • His information source is quite old. Speculation – This could be an individual who has experience that pre-dates the name change.
        • He did not bother to search the organization online.
  • Wang reported the use of the Nanjing University of Science and Technology Alumni Association in Hong Kong to illegally ship military and dual use technology to the PRC. While there is no evidence to support this claim, it is nonetheless quite feasible based on the following factors:
    • China routinely employs universities to buy and steal foreign technology with military applications; particularly those under the direction of SASTIND.
    • Chinese intelligence routinely employs informal groups such as friendship and alumni association to collect intelligence.
    • NUST has been implicated in attempting to buy (and buying) sensitive foreign military technology worldwide for at least two decades.
    • NUST conducts research to develop China’s most advanced military systems in laser technology, advanced imaging, hypersonic launch systems, and others.
    • The US Department of Commerce and other countries have denied technology sales to NUST under the Wassenaar Agreement.
    • The process he identified shipping military dual use technology through Hong Kong is common practice for Chinese intelligence and associated companies.
    • The process of dismantling and shipping military equipment he identified has been used by Chinese intelligence and associated companies.

Suppression of Dissidents

It seems unlikely that Wang had any role in the Causeway Bay Bookshop rendition operation of 2015 as claimed.  Five Hong Kong book shop staff were kidnapped by China’s Public Security Bureau and brought to China for prosecution.  Of interest was that one of the staff members was kidnapped in Thailand.  That a person was in a third country has profound implications for the rendition operation.

  • The Ministry of Public Security would not likely have conducted such a risky operation without support from China’s foreign intelligence services in-country (Ministry of State Security and/or the PLA Military Intelligence Department).
  • China probably coordinated this activity with the Thai government (probably police and customs services)

Wang claims his role in the Hong Kong operation was as follows:

  • He was given instructions from Xiang Xin to pay close attention to Lee Bo the bookshop owner because of the bookseller’s involvement in the publication of a controversial work about Chinese President Xi Jinping and “six women”.
  • Wang passed on the operational order to execute the operation.  (Again he identifies his role as largely an administrative one)

There are three significant problems with this claim:

  • Wang’s instructions “Pay close attention to” is hardly an action one basis a risky operational activity upon.  Wang makes no mention of subsequent reporting.
  • The operation was conducted by the Public Security Bureau, not the PLA General Staff Department which Wang claims was his chain of command.
  • It is almost impossible that the PLA GSD could give an order that would go through a co-opted company in Hong Kong to be executed by elements of Public Security elements.

Embezzle public funds through corporate espionage

While at first glance this appears to be a preposterous accusation, the practice is quite common in companies affiliated with China’s intelligence and military apparatus.  One must not apply Western standards when examining China’s intelligence apparatus. There have been occasions of an operational activity being stopped and prosecuted by another part of the CCP bureaucracy.  Sometimes this is as a result of internal infighting between CCP political factions.  In fact, the history of Chinese intelligence organizations is littered with incidents of units being dismantled and operatives being arrested because they presented a threat to one of many CCP factions.  Wang’s contention appears to be correct based on the following data:

  • Wang states that the Shanghai Economic Investigation Division froze the assets of Media companies owned by Guotai Holdings, China Trends, and China Innovation Investment Company Ltd. companies for suspected fraud (which he admits was done). The story is plausible and verifiable in public record and media accounts of the incident.


As mentioned in the introduction of this work the challenge for intelligence agencies is to separate fact from fiction.  That should be a relatively simple task given the names, locations, and dates Wang provided.  With that much data, at least some aspects of his story could be verified.  It seems unlikely he made up a story including dozens of names and organizations with dates, individual names, their corporate positions, and locations of events.  This is especially true when it would have been easier just to request asylum as a member of Hong Kong’s democracy movement.  In any case, with his story released to the public he will not be returning to China.

If some of the information provided by Wang is verified — which appears to be the case — then he is nothing more than a low level company employee who acted as a co-optee of China’s intelligence establishment.  Such relationships and operational activities are quite common in Chinese intelligence operations.

It is common practice for defectors to inflate their access or knowledge to make themselves appear more valuable to a country.  If Wang asserted himself as a higher level operative it is probably because of his lack of knowledge of intelligence operations.  Excitement and feelings of importance are often factors used to recruit persons whose lives and jobs otherwise seem mundane.  Such inflated beliefs of importance are common among recruited agents and co-optees who, due to nothing other than circumstances and position, find themselves engaged in the great game between nations.


[i] I’ve seen mistakes like this happen. Sophisticated organizations have issued passports with mistakes leaving operatives all over the world vulnerable to keenly aware customs officials.

[ii] “China Innovation Investment Limited 1217.HK,” Reuters,

[iii] “About Us,” China Innovation Investment Limited, last modified 2018,

[iv] “China Trends Holdings Limited 8171.HK,” Reuters,

[v] See Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China The People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China 29 (1995), supra note 34, at 17-18.

Copyright © Nicholas Eftimiades 2019


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